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VICTIMS AND VOYEURS AT THE CRIMINAL
TRIAL
Paul Gewirtz*
Law is all about human life, yet struggles to keep life at bay. This
is especially true of the criminal trial. With the public typically rank-
ing crime our country's most important problem, the criminal trial re-
flects and ignites large passions. Yet it usually seeks to exclude much
of that passion from its stage as the trial proceeds with its structured
process of legal proof and judgment.
Maintaining the boundary between the courtroom and ordinary
life is a central part of what legal process is all about. Distinctive legal
rules of procedure, jurisdiction, and evidence insist upon and define
law's autonomous character-indeed constitute the very basis of a
court's authority. The mob may have their faces pressed hard against
the courthouse windows, but the achievement of the trial is to keep
those forces at bay, or at least to transmute their energy into a stylized
formal ritual of proof and judgment.
But there is always a struggle between this idealized vision of
law-which proclaims that law is and must be separate from politics,
passion, and public resistance-and the relentless incursion of the tu-
mult of ordinary life. This struggle was at the heart of the federal
courts' most significant project of this century: the effort beginning
with Brown v. Board of Education to desegregate American life, in
which the courts have both sought to disregard white resistance and
yet inescapably been forced to take account of it.' An analogous
struggle is enacted daily in criminal courts throughout the country.
At the criminal trial, the struggle is largely played out over narra-
tive construction and reception-a struggle about what stories may be
told at trial, how stories must be told, who is the appropriate audience,
how stories must be heard. Storytelling must conform to certain dis-
* Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law, Yale Law School. I particularly wish to
thank Peter Brooks, Tripp Professor of Humanities at Yale University, for his help in developing
some of the ideas here. This paper was originally presented at the Symposium, "Narrative and
Rhetoric in the Law," held at Yale Law School on February 10-11, 1995. It is appearing in
substantially the same form in a collection of the Symposium essays that Professor Brooks and I
have edited called Law's Stories being published this Spring by Yale University Press.
1 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
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tinctive legal rules of storytelling contained in the law of evidence and
procedure. Seen this way, in fact, the entire law of evidence, and
much of the law of procedure, is really a law of narrative-a law of
narrative transactions. Yet, for all the rules that seek to maintain the
trial as a place separate and apart, there are unceasing pressures to let
ordinary life in, to allow people to tell the stories they tell in ordinary
life in the way they usually tell them.
In the narrative transactions of the criminal trial, two categories
of insurgent participants pose the greatest challenge today, threaten-
ing to invade the criminal trial with their anger, fear, and ignorance, as
well as their concern and curiosity. These are, first, crime victims,
which through the modem "victims' rights movement" are pressing
for an ever-larger but problematic role, and, second, the general pub-
lic, which is terrified of crime and for that reason and others has be-
come fascinated by criminal trials and presses for involvement in new
and rather alarming ways as both audience and participant.
These two categories of insurgent participants are my immediate
subject. Beginning with the roles of crime victims, I first examine the
growing use of "victim impact statements" at sentencing. I then con-
sider the increasing presence of the general public as a voyeuristic au-
dience for major criminal trials. Each has a place, I think, in spite of
serious risks. But my treatment of these interrelated issues of victim
and public also reflects a broader underlying purpose, which is to aug-
ment our understanding of the criminal trial by examining it as a type
of narrative and as a forum for narrative transactions. Ideas about
"narrative" and "storytelling" have become significant in legal schol-
arship in recent years-primarily as oppositional to traditional modes
of legal argument and as a method of struggle by minorities, women,
and other marginal groups.2 In fact, though, narrative and storytelling
pervade the law, from the competing narratives in trial court proceed-
ings to the legal and historical narratives appearing in Supreme Court
opinions. This Article should be seen as in part an effort to broaden
the study of narrative in the law today-not only to examine narrative
in a wider range of legal arenas but also to emphasize neglected com-
plexities of how narratives are constructed and presented and produce
2 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991); Jane B. Baron, Resistance to
Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal
Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword:
Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989). Critiques of some of this scholarship include
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives,
45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993), and Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
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their various effects. Thinking about the trial as narrative or story-
telling can bring fresh attention to the communicative exchanges cen-
tral to the trial, directing us to the fact that the trial is centrally an
arena of speakers and listeners, that the trial's search for truth always
proceeds by way of competing attempts to shape and present narra-
tives for particular audiences, that the form of telling and the setting
of listening affect everything, and that telling and listening are com-
plex transactions that jointly create meaning and significance.
I. Vicrms
A. The Victim in Trial Narratives
The existence of a victim, of course, is what prompts the criminal
trial. The earliest court proceedings in England denominated "crimi-
nal" were, in fact, private prosecutions brought by the victim directly.3
But as the criminal process evolved, prosecution became a govern-
ment function. The victim became a trigger and a witness for the
prosecution, rather than the prosecution's director. Put another way,
the victim was no longer the guiding narrator of the proceedings but
became instead just one of many storytellers at trial. Today, criminal
litigation against the alleged wrongdoer is controlled by a government
prosecutor, not by the victim, and it is the government, not the victim,
that decides which witnesses to present, guides the stories they tell,
and shapes opening and closing statements to the jury. Thus, the
modern prosecution is not really a battle between the victim and the
accused. A criminal prosecution claiming that Smith was robbed by
defendant Jones is not captioned Smith v. Jones but is called The State
v. Jones or The People v. Jones. The abstraction of the "state" calls the
wrongdoer to account, displacing the victim because the wrong is seen
as one against the community as much as any particular victim.
For many, substituting the state for the victim in prosecuting
crime is a great achievement. It keeps at bay the immediate passions
of an injured victim, especially unmediated revenge. It transforms a
private vendetta into a public concern. 4 It depersonalizes law enforce-
ment and underscores the public values at stake. Government prose-
cutors are guided by role norms that are supposed to make them more
objective and public-spirited than the typical private lawyer-hence
the motto inscribed in a rotunda in the U.S. Department of Justice:
"The United States wins its point whenever justice is done . .. ."
3 See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Criminal Law, 17 AM. J.
LEGAL Hisr. 313 (1973).
4 The central myth about the birth of law in Western literature, Aeschylus' Oresteia, is an
account of a transformation from a system of blood revenge to a public process of adjudicating
crimes. See Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus' Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
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There is much that is noble in this government role. But there is
also a loss, or at least an asymmetry. The accused, after all, is repre-
sented by a lawyer devoted to his or her client's interests rather than
"justice," and who thinks, in effect, that "defendants win their point
only when juries vote not-guilty." The professional prosecutor typi-
cally identifies with other law enforcement professionals and usually
does not display the same personal association and identification with
the victim that the defense lawyer displays for the defendant. The
victim can be pushed to one side-left in the dark about court dates,
treated as an emotional annoyance by law enforcement bureaucrats,
"victimized" a second time (as victims and their families often com-
plain today). And the victim loses control of how his or her story is
presented.
The place of the victim in the evolving courtroom narrative is
most problematic in a murder case, where the victim is dead-dead
and silent, unable to tell his or her own story. In many cases, in fact,
victims are murdered in order to silence them.5 The absence of the
murder victim at trial can be a gaping absence, but it is still absence,
and presence is almost always more vivid than absence. Thus, in the
competing narratives of a trial, the narrative of the murder victim has
a certain comparative disadvantage-not simply because these victims
are absent but because the plots of their lives are over; we know how
their stories end. Even if against our will, a murder trial inevitably
draws us into the defendant's story simply because it remains incom-
plete and therefore invites us to supply imagined endings as the de-
fendant's fate unfolds in court. By contrast, there is no suspense in
courtroom narratives about the murder victim.
Murder victims are silenced in another respect. Because they
cannot testify or be cross-examined, even their utterances and writings
while they were alive may be excludable. Consider Judge Lance Ito's
ruling on the admissibility of various pieces of evidence of O.J. Simp-
son's stalking and abuse of Nicole Brown Simpson in the notorious
murder trial. The judge admitted evidence of O.J. Simpson's past be-
havior that living witnesses had observed; but he excluded evidence of
what Nicole Brown Simpson herself had told others O.J. Simpson was
doing and excluded what she had written in her diary. What Nicole
Brown Simpson told others was hearsay; because she was no longer
alive, she could not be cross-examined about what she had said and
written. The fact that there was no reason to doubt the truth of what
she told others (or wrote), that what she said appeared to be distinctly
reliable hearsay, was irrelevant. Evidence that tended to show that
her husband had a motive to kill her became inadmissible because she
5 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 498 (1987), discussed infra. There, an elderly
couple was murdered in the course of a robbery because the robber "knew that [they] could
identify him." Id.
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was killed-because (on the prosecutor's theory of the case) the al-
leged motive was a successful spur to action.
6
Therefore, particularly in murder cases, where the victim is ab-
sent and silent, there is an understandable effort to make more pres-
ent the life that was taken and to vocalize the suffering the murder
caused. One is reminded here of an extreme case, the scene in Rich-
ard Wright's novel Native Son where the prosecutor actually wheels
the dead and battered body of one of Bigger Thomas's victims into
court to make her visible-a grotesque device that counters Bigger's
grotesque device of trying to make his first victim literally invisible by
incinerating her body in the family's furnace.7 More realistically and
currently, the prosecutors in the O.J. Simpson case repeatedly showed
the jury photographs and videotapes of the battered, bloodied bodies
of the murder victims, not simply to establish technical facts about
how they were murdered but precisely to balance the technical facts,
and to insist on the vivid human particularity of the people whose
lives had been extinguished. Similarly, the prosecutors played tapes
of Nicole Brown Simpson's 911 phone calls to the police, not simply to
give the jury some factual background for the murders (which a tran-
script of the phone calls could do) but to let them hear Nicole Brown
Simpson's voice, let them hear her fear, to give her presence. And at
the end of her closing to the jury, prosecutor Marcia Clark replayed
the 911 tapes and said: "Usually I feel I'm the only one left to speak
for the victims. But Nicole and Ron are speaking to you."8
Others also try to fill the gap created by the victim's silence and
absence in the narrative exchanges of the murder trial. Because mur-
der victims can neither tell what happened to them nor witness their
vindication, surviving family and friends usually try to fill those roles
of storyteller and audience. Family and friends tell the victims' stories
in an effort to keep the victims visible, as if to say, "We speak in place
of those who cannot speak." And they sit prominently in the court-
room audience, as if to say to the other participants, "We are listening
in place of those who cannot listen." Like victims themselves in
nonmurder cases, survivors sometimes stand back from the criminal
6 To be sure, Judge Ito did rule admissible a considerable amount of evidence about O.J.
Simpson's prior abuse of his wife. So it might be said that he simply excluded evidence that was
not necessary for the prosecution and that was most questionable as a matter of evidence law
(and, if admitted, would make a conviction most vulnerable to reversal on appeal). There is
truth to this, but the excluded evidence would have significantly added to the cumulative weight
of O.J. Simpson's prior abuse. It is the cumulative evidence of abuse that arguably demon-
strated the degree and intensity of his obsessiveness for control, and therefore made more plau-
sible the argument that it could ultimately escalate to murder. In any event, the excluded
evidence does underscore the various ways in which victims are silenced at trial-silenced by
their murderers but also by legal rules that reinforce that silence.
7 RIcHARD WRIGHT, NATIvE SON 305-08 (Perennial Library ed. 1966).
8 A Haunting End to O.J. Trial, S.F. EXAM., Sept. 30, 1995, at 1.
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process with their own numbed silence; but like living victims, they
commonly push with vocal sorrow and rage to be included. They, too,
want a presence.
Modem law enforcement continues to struggle to find an appro-
priate place for victims and survivors in the criminal process without
sacrificing the public purposes that structure and constrain the crimi-
nal trial. Indeed, no movement in criminal law has been more power-
ful in the past twenty years than the "victims' rights" movement,
which has sought to enhance the place of the victim in the criminal
trial process. 9 In significant part, this movement reflects the sense of
many that the law had evolved too far in the direction of protecting
the rights of defendants and had slighted the interests of victims.
Thus, the contemporary victims' rights movement has successfully ad-
vocated not only that specific legal rules be modified to give the inter-
ests of crime victims greater weight (for example, definitions and
proof rules in rape cases) but also that crime victims be assured of
restitution, compensation, and counseling, that victims be consulted
before plea bargains are finalized, and that victim impact evidence be
considered at sentencing. 10
B. "Victim Impact Evidence" in Trial Narratives
The use of victim impact evidence in death penalty sentencing has
been an explosive issue on the Supreme Court in recent years, and is
my focus here." In 1987, in a case named Booth v. Maryland,12 a
9 For discussions of the modem victims' rights movement in criminal law, see, e.g., GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME (1995); ROBERT ELIAS. THE POLITICS OF VICriMIZA-
TION (1986); ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VicrIms: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICrIMOLOGY (1984);
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FOUR YEARS LATER: A REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME
(1986); Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss.
L.J. 515 (1982); Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1411 (1993); Lynne N.
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985); Donald Hall, Victims'
Voices in Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 233 (1991); Leroy L
Lambom, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The Proposals for a Constitutional
Amendment, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 125 (1987); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357 (1986); Josephine Gittler, Expanding the
Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV.
117 (1984).
On the history and theory of victimhood more generally, see JOSEPH AMATO, VICrIMS AND
VALUES: A HISTORY AND A THEORY OF SUFFERING (1990); WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE
VICTIM (1971); and CHARLES SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERiCAN
CHARACTER (1992).
10 Representative samples of items on the victims' rights agenda are contained in the Federal
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995), and the Federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 10601-10604 (West
1995).
11 In addition to the more general literature on the victims' rights movement cited at note 9
supra, writings specifically on victim impact statements include: Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffer-
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closely divided Court held that it is unconstitutional for prosecutors to
use a victim impact statement (VIS) during capital sentencing. 13 But
in a 1991 case, Payne v. Tennessee,14 a newly constituted Court over-
ruled Booth and made most victim impact evidence admissible at capi-
tal sentencing-over angry and impassioned dissents.
Booth involved a brutal double murder of a elderly couple during
a robbery in their home. The VIS in the case, given as an appendix to
this Article, is instructive about what such statements are like and
what being a murder victim's survivor is like.15 The VIS here was a
document prepared by an employee of the state Division of Parole
and Probation-who refers to herself as "the writer"-and was read
to the jury by the prosecutor. The Supreme Court summarized the
VIS as follows:
The VIS in Booth's case was based on interviews with the Bron-
steins' son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter. Many of their
comments emphasized the victims' outstanding personal qualities. and
noted how deeply the Bronsteins would be missed. Other parts of the
VIS described the emotional and personal problems the family members
have faced as a result of the crimes. The son, for example, said that he
suffers from lack of sleep and depression, and is "fearful for the first
time in his life." He said that in his opinion, his parents were "butchered
like animals." The daughter said she also suffers from lack of sleep, and
that since the murders she has become withdrawn and distrustful. She
stated that she can no longer watch violent movies or look at kitchen
knives without being reminded of the murders. The daughter concluded
that she could not forgive the murderer, and that such a person could
"[n]ever be rehabilitated." Finally, the granddaughter described how
the deaths had ruined the wedding of another close family member that
took place a few days after the bodies were discovered. Both the cere-
ing-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21 (1992);
Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 77; Dina R. Hellerstein,
The Victim Impact Statement" Reform or Reprisal?, 27 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 391 (1989); Victor D.
Vital, Payne v. Tennessee: The Use of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Trials, 19 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 497 (1994); Carole Mansur, Comment, Payne v. Tennessee: The Effect of
Victim Harm at Capital Sentencing Trials and the Resurgence of Victim Impact Statements, 27
NEw ENG. L. Rv. 713 (1993).
12 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
13 Id. Booth was followed in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).14 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
15 Interestingly, one of the things we learn from the VIS is that a sizable part of the pain of
being a victim or survivor is telling and listening to stories about the murder, hearing about the
murder on television, watching details about the murder at the trial, and so forth. Several of the
survivors became unable to listen to further stories about the crime or, for that matter, stories
about other crimes. One "can't watch movies with bodies or stabbings in it." Another can't
watch television news stories about violence. A granddaughter who had previously been an
"avid reader of murder mysteries" can't read them anymore. As we learn, however, survivors
are unable to escape the worst stories about the murder-the stories they tell themselves. Most
of the survivors describe re-enacting the crime or its discovery in their imagination again and
again, a narrative that just refuses to conclude, rewinding and replaying endlessly.
90:863 (1996)
HeinOnline -- 90 Nw. U. L. Rev.  869 1995-1996
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mony and the reception were sad affairs, and instead of leaving for her
honeymoon, the bride attended the victims' funeral. The VIS also noted
that the granddaughter had received counseling for several months after
the incident, but eventually had stopped because she concluded that "no
one could help her."
The government official who conducted the interviews concluded
the VIS by writing:
It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to the family
members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein is still such a shock-
ing, painful, and devastating memory to them that it permeates every
aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful that they will ever be able to
fully recover from this tragedy and not be haunted by the memory of the
brutal manner in which their loved ones were murdered and taken from
them. 1
6
As this summary indicates, the document contained three differ-
ent kinds of victim impact evidence, all of which Booth deemed inad-
missible in capital jury sentencing proceedings: (1) evidence about the
impact of the crime on the victims and the victims' survivors; (2) evi-
dence concerning the victims' particular characteristics; and (3) survi-
vors' personal opinions about the defendant and the appropriate
sentence. I focus here on the first two categories of victim impact
evidence, which are the two types of evidence that Payne v. Tennessee,
in overturning Booth, has held admissible. 17 Should these victim im-
pact stories be excluded from sentencing-and, in any event, why are
such stories so often perceived as problematic?
Introducing victim impact evidence at the proceeding on whether
the defendant should live or die almost always increases the chance
that the jury will impose a death sentence. Thus, one basis for oppos-
ing such evidence is flat opposition to the death penalty itself. But
this was not the rationale of the Supreme Court when it excluded vic-
tim impact evidence in Booth (nor is it the rationale usually given, at
least publicly, by critics who object to victim impact evidence).
Rather, the Booth majority (like most other critics) argued that this
evidence was irrelevant to whether the death penalty should be im-
posed and would distort and inflame the jury's judgment-thus
"creat[ing] a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may im-
pose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner"'18 in
16 Booth, 482 U.S. at 499-500 (citations omitted).
17 Evidence in the third category-survivors' personal opinions about the defendant and the
appropriate sentence-raises different issues, is relatively uncommon, and is the sort of witness
"opinion evidence" that is typically inadmissible. All of the six Justices who voted in Payne v.
Tennessee to overturn Booth's exclusion of the first two categories of evidence were careful not
to approve admitting this category of evidence. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2; id. at 835 n.1 (Souter,
J., with whom Justice Kennedy joins, concurring).
18 Booth, 482 U.S. at 503. Legal rules about the use of victim impact statements can be seen
and evaluated like any other problem of evidence in criminal trials. But the legal status of such
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violation of the Constitution's prohibition on "cruel or unusual pun-
ishments." But these arguments, for the most part, are weak.
1. Narrative Relevance.-The Booth Court's main argument
concerns relevance-a claim that evidence of the suffering of the vic-
tims' family and evidence of the victims' personal characteristics are
irrelevant to the defendant's blameworthiness and thus irrelevant to
the decision whether this defendant should receive the death penalty.
But even assuming that blameworthiness is the only measure of rele-
vance in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, why isn't the
defendant to blame for the suffering endured by the survivors of
someone he or she has intentionally murdered? The Booth Court ar-
gues that the defendant may have had "no knowledge about the exist-
ence or characteristics of the victims' family,"'19 but surely that does
not mean that the defendant is without blame or responsibility for that
family's suffering. Precedent, as well as common sense, establishes
that defendants are deemed blameworthy and responsible for the
"probable consequences of [their] actions"20 and that acts done with
the same state of mind may have different legal consequences depend-
ing on the actual harm caused.
21
evidence is a special problem for at least three reasons: it has become an issue of constitutional
law (the law of evidence is mostly common law or statutory law); it concerns evidence used at
sentencing rather than at the guilt phase of a trial; and the leading cases all concern its use in the
context of death penalty sentencing. Nevertheless, the issues posed by victim impact statements
can be divided into the two questions typically considered when deciding whether certain evi-
dence should be admissible at trial, and the Supreme Court has at least implicitly addressed
these two questions in analyzing the status of victim impact statements under the Constitution.
First, is the evidence relevant to some issue being decided at trial? Second, assuming that the
evidence has relevant probative value, is it likely to have a "prejudicial effect" that outweighs its
usefulness-most typically, is the evidence likely to distort the search for truth more than en-
lighten it? These are both socially contingent inquiries that may change over time. Many kinds
of stories have historically been excluded from trial as "irrelevant" because of what we would
now call a failure to define the contested issue properly or a blindness to some reliable connec-
tion between the story and the contested issue. The idea of prejudice is also socially contingent.
Over the years, as social and political attitudes have changed, the prior sexual behavior of de-
fendants or victims, for example, has been deemed either relevant or irrelevant to the proof of
certain crimes, and at times unduly prejudicial (and thus excludable) and at times not.
19 Id. at 504.
20 Id. at 505.
21 Payne, 501 U.S. at 819; South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). In a pre-Booth capital case,
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not bar
imposing the death penalty on two brothers who had assisted their father in an armed prison
breakout and a related kidnapping and robbery that resulted in several murders, even though
the brothers themselves had not taken "any act which [they] desired to, or was substantially
certain would, cause death." Id. at 150. "What was critical to the defendants' eligibility for the
death penalty in Tson was the harm they helped bring about" and their "reckless indifference to
human life," Gathers, 490 U.S. at 818, 819 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), regardless of whether they
had the intent to kill. As Justice White argued in his dissent in Booth, it is common in the law for
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As Justice David Souter argues in his concurring opinion in
Payne, which overruled Booth, "every defendant... endowed with the
mental competence for criminal responsibility" knows that a murder
will predictably impose harms on survivors and that the life he takes is
that of a unique human being.22 Even Justice John Paul Stevens, who
concurred in Booth and dissented in Payne, concedes this, and he is
left to make the curious argument that particular "[e]vidence about
who those survivors are and what harms and deprivations they have
suffered is therefore not necessary to apprise the sentencer of any in-
formation that was actually foreseeable to the defendant. '23 It would
only "divert the jury's attention," he says.24 But to the extent that
predictable and foreseeable consequences of murder actually occur in
a specific case, that particular evidence seems to provide a highly rele-
vant reason for punishing a particular defendant more severely.
Justice Stevens embellishes his argument in Payne by making a
distinction between what a legislature may do when setting general
standards for sentencing and what a judge or jury may do in imposing
an individual sentence:
The majority... fails to differentiate between legislative determina-
tions and judicial sentencing. It is true that an evaluation of the harm
caused by different kinds of wrongful conduct is a critical aspect in legis-
lative definitions of offenses and determinations concerning sentencing
guidelines .... But the majority cites no authority for the suggestion
that unforeseeable and indirect harms to a victim's family are properly
considered as aggravating evidence on a case-by-case basis. 25
It is hard to see, however, why there is any general problem with case-
by-case judicial consideration of harm to survivors (and, revealingly,
Stevens fudges his objection by linking it to a claim that the particular
punishment to turn on the harm caused, "irrespective of the offender's specific intent to cause
such harm." "[S]omeone who drove his car recklessly through a stoplight and unintentionally
killed a pedestrian merits significantly more punishment than someone who drove his car reck-
lessly through the same stoplight at a time when no pedestrians were there to be hit." Booth.
482 U.S. at 516.
The argument that different levels of punishment may be appropriate where there are dif-
ferent consequences, despite the fact that the punished people have the same state of mind, is
bolstered by important recent philosophical writing on "moral luck." This work has challenged
the notion that the moral status of an action is dependent solely on factors under the actor's
control, and suggests that the luck of unintended consequences (or of personality or intentions)
can affect an action's moral status. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILTY OF GOODNESS
336-40 (1986); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24 (1979); Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 20-39 (1981). The notion being challenged-that luck cannot
affect one's moral status-has its classic expression in the work of Immanuel Kant. See, e.g.,
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 62 (H.J. Paton trans., 1964)
(1785).
22 Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 (Souter, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 865 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
24 Id.
25 Id at 861-62.
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harm to survivors is "unforeseeable" or "indirect"). Legislatures pun-
ish murder so severely at least in part because murder predictably im-
poses these harms. The actual occurrence of these harms in a specific
case seems to be a relevant reason to punish a particular defendant
more severely. Certainly if relevant in legislatively setting the general
parameters of punishment, it is relevant to the individual punishment
decision. Indeed, the relevance of victim impact evidence to sentenc-
ing ultimately seems to be conceded even by the Booth majority,
which is careful to emphasize it is not holding that victim impact evi-
dence must be excluded from non-capital sentencing. 26
One of the themes of the storytelling movement in law is relevant
here. The account of the suffering of the victim's survivors in individ-
ual cases is a particularization of a generally foreseeable harm. Partic-
ularization, the theorists of storytelling remind us, invites empathetic
concern in a way that abstractions and general rules do not, and en-
courages appreciation of complexity.27 Indeed, something like that in-
sight surely underlies the Supreme Court's constitutional rule that in
death penalty sentencing defendants must be allowed to introduce any
and all mitigating evidence-any and all particularized evidence
about their background, upbringing, and so forth, that might lead a
jury to conclude that a death sentence would not be appropriate.28
Permitting similar particularization in victim impact evidence likewise
encourages empathetic concern for the victim and the victim's survi-
vors, as well as a complex understanding of the defendant's crime.29
To be sure, the defendant's story and the victim or survivor's story are
about different matters, but in the context of sentencing they can be
seen as counter-stories, which should both be available to the deci-
sionmaker.30 (Indeed, in the most literal sense, victim impact evi-
dence consists of stories of victimized and silenced people, who are
the usual concern of many in the storytelling movement.) If particu-
26 Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10, 509 n.12.
27 See articles cited in note 2 supra and my introductory essay, Narrative and Rhetoric in the
Law, in LAW'S SToREEs (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., forthcoming 1996).
28 E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
29 The dissenters in Booth and the majority in Payne argue that it is only fair to allow evi-
dence about particular characteristics of the murder victim because the Constitution has been
interpreted to allow capital defendants to introduce any evidence about their particular charac-
teristics that might lead a jury to decide to mitigate the punishment. It is true, as Justice Stevens
says in his Payne dissent, that our law often embraces rules "weighted in the defendant's favor"
(the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt; rules regarding evidence of the defendant's
character and reputation). 501 U.S. at 860. But the question is: Why should there be a weight-
ing or asymmetry concerning this particular kind of evidence? If information about the defend-
ant's particular characteristics is thought helpful at sentencing, why isn't the same true of
information about the victim's particular characteristics?
30 As Martha Minow has written, "[t]he biggest check on selectivity problems in storytelling
lies in the availability of another story." Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAw's SToREs, supra
note 27.
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larized storytelling should have a greater place in the law, does not the
particularized story of the murder victim and the victim's survivors
warrant that place?
In fact, however, many liberals who extol the place of stories in
law believe that victim impact statements should be excluded from
court. There are reasons to want these stories excluded-for exam-
ple, opposition to any penalty-phase evidence that makes death
sentences or longer prison terms more likely. But if this is the true
reason, it makes something clear that is not always clear: For some in
the storytelling movement, the point is not simply to strengthen the
place of stories in law, but to strengthen stories making particular
political points; they are not really making a claim about the general
value of storytelling as an alternative way of knowing and persuading,
but rather a claim about the strategic value of some stories as an alter-
native way of promoting a particular substantive point of view.
One might perhaps distinguish here between the relevance of evi-
dence about the harm suffered by the survivors (the first category)
and the relevance of evidence of the victim's particular characteristics
(the second category). On the one hand, the latter evidence can be
seen as simply an extension of the first category-a particularization
of the harm caused. This is how the Payne majority sees it-charac-
terizing this evidence as simply "offering 'a quick glimpse of the life'
which a defendant 'chose to extinguish,' showing "each victim's 'uni-
queness as an individual human being,'" making sure that the jury
understands that the murdered person was a specific, situated human
being and not just an abstract "victim."' 31 But such evidence can be
seen as not only a particularization of a life story but also a valuation
of that particular life story. To the extent that this category of evi-
dence makes an implicit or explicit claim that the life taken was com-
paratively more valuable than many other lives and that the death
penalty is therefore more appropriate, it raises a distinctive moral
problem.3 2 But the relevance of impact evidence in at least the first
31 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, 823 (citations and emphases omitted).
32 Many people, of course, do believe that some lives are more valuable than others-
although they would probably prefer to say that some lives contribute more to human better-
ment than other lives, so their loss imposes more harm on the community. But many others
believe such a position is repellent. The majority in Booth suggests, albeit in a footnote, that
"our system of justice does not tolerate" the notion that "defendants whose victims were assets
to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to
be less worthy." 482 U.S. at 506 n.8. The majority in Payne tries to avoid this issue by insisting
that evidence of the victim's particular characteristics "is not offered to encourage comparative
judgments of this kind .... It is designed to show instead each victim's 'uniqueness as an individ-
ual human being,' whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his
death might be." 501 U.S. at 823. One question is whether the jury will distinguish between this
particularization and a comparative valuation (and whether, if pushed, the Payne majority would
say that the jury must do so).
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category-evidence about the harm suffered by survivors-seems
clear to me.
2. Narrative Presentation and Reception.-In spite of this con-
clusion, however, I do think there are grounds for concern about vic-
tim impact evidence-not based on the relevance of the stories told,
but on the dynamics of presentation and reception of the stories.
Those who have recently focused on storytelling in law have gen-
erally addressed the substance of the stories told and the fact of their
particularity but have not explored the dynamics of their articulation,
transmission, and reception, which have been themes of narrative the-
ory in literary studies.33 The law is quite self-conscious about these
dynamics in various contexts. Judges instruct juries throughout the
trail about how the jury should listen to what it hears-for example,
that a given legal standard should provide the framework for listening
to factual narratives, that certain evidence is admissible to prove X
but not Y, that jurors should disregard certain evidence previously
heard, should not be swayed by passion or prejudice, and so forth-
and theories of audience reception surely underlie these instruc-
tions.34 Rules regarding the testimony of children in abuse cases, the
admissibility of "dying declarations" or so-called res gestae, and the
admissibility of custodial confessions all reflect notions about how the
activity and context of storytelling affect the storytellers themselves.
Similarly, the traditional concerns about cameras in the courtroom re-
flect an appreciation of how audiences can affect speakers.
Looking at victim impact evidence as narrative transactions-
narratives told and received in a certain way-highlights issues about
Justice White's dissent in Booth took on the majority more directly, arguing that the state
may, "if it chooses, include as a sentencing consideration the particularized harm that an individ-
ual's murder causes to the rest of society." 482 U.S. at 517. This is apparently a willingness to
allow stronger punishments to be imposed on defendants whose victims are perceived to be
greater assets to the community. (White points to federal statutes that authorize death sentences
for the murder of only certain specified public officials, such as the President, id. at 517 n.2,
although those statutes can be seen as authorizing greater punishments when a killing is an
attack on the state as well as an individual victim.) As noted above, the Court majority in Payne
v. Tennessee tries to avoid White's argument. However, in other legal contexts, such as civil
wrongful death actions, juries are invited to make different-sized damage awards based on the
relative harm caused by the loss of the life in question or some similar valuation.
33 E.g., PETER BROoKs, READING FOR THE PLOT 216-37 (Vintage 1985); M. BAKHFTIN, Tim
DIALOGIC IMAGINATiON 259 (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans.,
1981).
34 It would be an interesting project to examine various "model instructions" for the purpose
of excavating and analyzing theories of audience reception that underlie them, including the
basic assumption that a judge's instructions can significantly affect how the jury processes what it
hears.
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this evidence at least as serious as issues about what the evidence
says. 35
(a) Narrative emotion. -First, there is an issue of how victim
impact evidence is received by its primary jury audience. Such evi-
dence, which usually describes either the emotional responses of sur-
vivors or especially appealing characteristics of the murder victim, is
likely to invite an emotional reaction from the jury that hears it.36 Is
the very fact that victim impact evidence would vividly remind the
jury of the awful emotional reality of the crime's impact-one of the
reasons such evidence seems relevant-also a reason for excluding it?
The Supreme Court has often said, after all, that the decision of
whether to impose the death penalty must turn on a "reasoned moral
response ... rather than an emotional one." 37 Indeed, more gener-
35 1 do not address in the text one aspect of this that the Booth opinion discusses: that evi-
dence about the victim and survivors may lead the defendant to want to rebut this evidence,
producing a mini-trial about the victim and victim's family that consumes time and distracts
attention from the defendant and the crime. 482 U.S. at 506-07. Telling a story often prompts
others to tell a story, and this is especially true in our adversarial system, where virtually no
utterance by one side goes unanswered by the other. But the argument about distraction really
begs the question here, which is whether victim evidence is indeed a distraction from relevant
matters or is itself one of the relevant matters. That issue I have discussed in the text above.
The length of court time that such matters consume is essentially a management issue that courts
are well equipped to handle-indeed, they handle such issues on a daily basis. The fear of
distraction is largely chimerical. Indeed, in Booth itself there was no distraction problem, for
victim impact evidence was presented through the reading of a compact document rather than
through the more time-consuming presentation of live witnesses, and there was no defense
rebuttal.
36 Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09 ("[T]he formal presentation of this information by the State can
serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the
relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. As we have noted, any decision to
impose the death sentence must 'be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.' The admission of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury
should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we re-
quire in capital cases.") (citations omitted); see Payne, 501 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that victim impact evidence "serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide
in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their reason"); cf id.
at 831-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that jurors were "moved by this testimony"
about the survivors' emotional suffering, and acknowledging "the possibility that this evidence
may in some cases be unduly inflammatory," but concluding that this does not justify a prophy-
lactic, Constitution-based rule that this evidence may never be admitted, because "unduly in-
flammatory" evidence that renders the proceedings "fundamentally unfair" may be excluded
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. id. at 836 (Souter, J., concur-
ring) ("Evidence about the victim and survivors, and any jury argument predicated on it, can of
course be so inflammatory as to risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not delibera-
tion."); see also Victim Justice, NEw REPUBLIc, Apr. 17, 1995, at 9.
37 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990) (refusing to strike down an instruction at the
penalty phase of a capital trial telling the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy); id. at 493 ("It
would be very difficult to reconcile a rule allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries
of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities with our longstanding recognition that, above all,
capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary."); id. at 495 ("The objectives of
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ally, a central part of the prevailing ideology of law is that it is a realm
of reason, not emotion.38
Although I share concerns about the responses that victim impact
evidence may provoke and, as indicated below, think judges must be
attentive to potential dangers, I do not think such evidence should be
faulted or excluded simply because it produces an emotional reaction.
First, such a notion would prove (and would exclude) far too much,
because a high proportion of now-admissible evidence produces some
emotional reaction in jurors. Both conservative and liberal members
of the Supreme Court have been blatantly inconsistent about this, in-
yoking the notion that law is "reason not emotion" only when it is
convenient to do so. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for example, has
insisted that death penalty sentencing must be a "reasoned moral re-
sponse," not an "emotional response," as a reason for rejecting de-
fendants' objections to jury instructions directing jurors not to be
influenced by "sympathy. '39 But in Payne v. Tennessee, where prose-
cutors had introduced victim impact evidence that she conceded had
"moved" the jurors, Justice O'Connor concluded that their emotional
reactions were acceptable because the impact evidence "did not in-
flame their passions more than did the facts of the crime. ' 40 Liberals
have been inconsistent in the opposite way. Justice William Brennan,
for example, joined Booth v. Maryland, which excluded victim impact
evidence (as the defendant requested) and rested in part on the argu-
ment that the evidence was "emotionally charged" and that the death
penalty decision had to be "based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion. '41 But Justice Brennan saw a place for emotion when, in his
dissent in Saffle v. Parks,42 he agreed with the defendant that it was
constitutional error for capital sentencing juries to be instructed not to
be influenced by "sympathy"-even though Brennan seemed to ac-
knowledge that sympathy is an "emotion" and is "fairly regarded as a
synonym for 'compassion.' 43
The problem with the idea of excluding evidence that produces
an emotional response is more fundamental, however, for the glib dis-
fairness and accuracy are more likely to be threatened than promoted by a rule allowing the
sentence to turn not on whether the defendant, in the eyes of the community, is morally deserv-
ing of the death sentence, but on whether the defendant can strike an emotional chord in a
juror."); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding a
judge's instruction to a capital sentencing jury that it should not be swayed by "mere sympathy"
and affirming that the death penalty decision must be a "reasoned moral response," not an
"emotional response").
38 See Gewirtz, supra note 4.
39 Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40 Payne, 501 U.S. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 Booth, 482 U.S. at 508 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
42 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
43 Id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tinction between "reasoned" responses and "emotional" responses is
far too simplistic.44 This insight dates back at least to Plato.a5 But
more recently, scholars from fields as diverse as philosophy, psychol-
ogy, and neurobiology have demonstrated that emotions have a cogni-
tive dimension and are connected to beliefs in various respects.46 For
example, emotions can open up ways of knowing and seeing, and can
therefore contribute to reasoning. (Fear and caring, for example, can
make us attentive to more facts; sympathy may be part of properly
assessing mitigation evidence in capital sentencing.47) Indeed, reasons
are constituted in part by emotion, and are modifiable by emotion.
(Fear can be reduced by changing our beliefs; our general views about
gay people can be changed by empathy we come to feel towards a gay
relative.) Moreover, emotions can reveal beliefs that conscious
thought conceals (grief sometimes does this). And emotions are often
essential to the completion of a rational response (consider Michael
Dukakis's answer during a campaign debate to a question about what
he would think if his wife were raped and murdered, an answer that
was so abstract and unfeeling as to suggest a not fully rational
reaction).
This linkage and dialectic between emotion and reason is espe-
cially true of a jury sentencing decision. At the sentencing stage, the
jury is not being asked to find a fact (did the defendant do it?), but to
make a judgment about an appropriate punishment. That judgment
includes implementing retribution, which inevitably draws upon an
emotional element.48 In death penalty cases, that judgment also in-
cludes consideration of all of the defendant's mitigation evidence,
which brings into play the jury's sympathy and sense of mercy and also
surely involves nonrational elements. Similarly, considering victim
impact evidence involves nonrational elements of sympathy and
concern.49
This is not at all to deny that emotion can be a problem in the
courtroom, but rather to affirm that it is inescapable and has an ap-
44 I develop some of these points at greater length in On "I Know It When I See It", 105
YALE LJ. 1023 (1996).
45 See Anthony Kronman, Leontius' Tale, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 27.
46 See, e.g., EXPLAINING EMOTIONS (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980); RONALD DE
SOUSA, Tim RATIONALITY OF EMOTION (1987); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE
(1990); ANTONIO R. DAmAsiO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAIN (1994); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGIN OF
THE SOCIAL CONTRACr (1990);.
47 Cases upholding anti-sympathy jury instructions, such as California v. Brown and Saffle v.
Parks, fail to acknowledge this last point, however. See supra note 37.
48 See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punish-
ment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989).
49 See Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 947 (7th Cir. 1991) ("We must recognize that the
state should not be required to present victim impact evidence ... devoid of all passion.").
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propriate place. One should grant that emotion must be bounded if
the court is to remain a place of law. But the issue is boundedness,
not whether emotion has a place. There must be a limit on certain
types of emotional exchanges, such as those that are excessively in-
flammatory or those based on what we understand as prejudice. In
addition, emotional responses must be subjected to reasoned exami-
nation; the dialectic between reason and emotion should be explored.
But the trial setting facilitates this, for the lawyers on both sides are in
a position to offer the jury reasoned argument about testimony, in-
cluding emotional testimony. After victim impact evidence is
presented, for example, the lawyers should be allowed to make rea-
soned arguments to encourage jurors to think about their emotional
responses and test them through thought, and vice versa (both emo-
tions and rational beliefs can be unreliable). The arguments will con-
cern not only the significance of the victim impact evidence but also
the weight that evidence should receive given the extraordinary na-
ture of the death sentence, the relevant statutory standards governing
application of the death penalty, and the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence that seeks to generate a countervailing sympathy for the
defendant.
These arguments can help to make the jurors more self-conscious
about their reactions and can encourage reflection. The court can
therefore reduce the likelihood of what Paul Brest calls in another
context "selective sympathy and indifference" 50 a particularly worri-
some possibility here. Some of the concern about victim impact evi-
dence in death penalty cases surely rests upon the fact that in this
context the main audience is a lay jury, not a professional judge.
There are distinctive concerns about whether jurors will reflect upon
their emotional responses. But if the lawyers and the judge do their
jobs, the emotional reactions produced by both the prosecutor's vic-
tim impact evidence and the defendant's mitigation evidence can be
bounded and tested by reasoned argument-an activity that will not
50 Paul Brest, Foreword- In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. Rlv. 1,
7 (1976) (emphasis added). The problem of "selective sympathy" can undoubtedly surface in the
context of victim impact evidence. Specifically, evidence about the victim's particular character-
istics might evoke sympathy only for victims who come from a juror's own racial, ethnic, or class
background. See Harris, supra note 11. This problem is not peculiar to victim impact evidence.
It arises just as much in the context of the defendant's mitigation evidence, where there is a risk
that jurors will react sympathetically only to mitigating circumstances that resonate with their
own backgrounds. (This is one concern that the Supreme Court has said justifies the use of anti-
sympathy instructions at trials. See supra notes 37 and 47.) It also arises during the guilt phase
of trial, where there is always the possibility that jurors' assessments of witnesses' credibility will
rest upon selective identification with certain witnesses that is rooted in nonrational factors.
Thus, the risk of selective sympathy-which, in my judgment, is not only one of the most serious
problems with victim impact evidence but a serious problem in the criminal justice system more
generally-cannot be a basis for excluding victim impact evidence in particular. It can, however,
be the basis for efforts by lawyers and judges to make jurors more aware of their possible biases.
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obliterate the emotional dimension, but can cabin it and even deploy
it to promote a more reasoned decision.
In response to the concern that victim impact evidence may intro-
duce too much emotion into the jurors' sentencing decision, we might
also consider some restrictions regarding the form of such evidence.
The Maryland statute authorizing the use of victim impact evidence in
Booth provided that such evidence could be presented in two different
narrative forms: a government-prepared document read to the jury or
testimony by family members. These two forms of narrative may have
very different effects on the jury, though, and concern about emo-
tional effects might justify restrictions on live testimony by survivors.
Some differences between the forms of presenting victim impact
evidence give each form advantages and disadvantages for the prose-
cutor or defense. A VIS document can be shaped, structured, and
polished to produce a desired effect. It also has the imprimatur of the
"state" as author and therefore arguably gains narrative authority.51
The judge can also review it in advance and order inflammatory mate-
rial excised before the jury hears it. But as a written document that is
read, it will not have the human immediacy of live testimony from the
victims' survivors, which allows their sadness and suffering to be ob-
served, not just explained. And to the extent that the document re-
ports on what others say, it may be unreliable. Live testimony, by
contrast, is less shaped, because it must proceed by more fragmented
questions and answers and by direct and cross-examination, and in the
end is less controllable by both the lawyers and the judge. But since
the survivors will be testifying themselves, their evidence is likely to
be much more emotionally charged than a VIS document. In the Wis-
consin sentencing proceedings for Jeffrey Dahmer, for example, rela-
tives of his murder victims gave live testimony; some testimony was so
impassioned and angry that one surviving sister rushed at Dahmer and
tried to attack him in front of the judge.52
If given a choice among these forms, prosecutors must decide
what effect on the audience they wish to produce, as they must do in
choosing how stories are told throughout the trial. The self-conscious
51 As noted above in the Booth case the VIS read to the jury was prepared by a government
official, referred to as "the writer" in the VIS. Using indirect discourse, she retells the stories
that the victims' family members have told her. But "the writer" also reacts to what she has
recounted ("Perhaps [the victims' granddaughter] described the impact of the tragedy most elo-
quently when she stated that.. ."; "It became increasingly apparent to the writer as she talked to
the family members that..."). Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 511, 515 (1987). We are made
aware of the shaping voice of a narrator, and what the survivors are reported as saying gains
weight because this calm official narrator stands behind them. And because this official narrator
tells us her response to what the survivors have told her, we the audience-and, more important,
the audience of jurors-are pointed to an "appropriate" response and thus encouraged to re-
spond in the same way.
52 ABC World News Tonight (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 17, 1992).
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trial lawyer becomes a theorist of narrative forms, and so does a self-
conscious judge. A judge concerned about excessively emotional re-
sponses that victim impact evidence may unleash might consider re-
quiring the prosecutor to present this evidence to the sentencing jury
in the form of a VIS document instead of live survivor testimony.
(The defense counsel in Booth himself requested the use of a VIS doc-
ument, precisely to reduce "the inflammatory effect of the
information. '53)
An obvious problem with this documentary approach is that it
might preclude the defendant from directly challenging the victim-sur-
vivor statements through cross-examination. But it need not. The de-
fendants might be allowed, if they wished, to call the victim-survivors
as witnesses and cross-examine them about their statements in the
VIS. Such a system would limit prosecutors' ability to present victim
impact evidence in its most vivid form but would allow defendants to
decide whether the benefits from confronting live witnesses would
outweigh the risks of generating excessively dramatic testimony. In
any event, it is settled constitutional law that the Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses does not require the usual examination and
cross-examination of live witnesses at the sentencing stage; sentencing
judges all the time impose sentences based on written information in
pre-sentence reports that are not subject to cross-examination. 54 In
short, judges seem to have the power to modulate the emotional ef-
fects of victim impact evidence by using narrative forms most suitable
to this context-reducing, if not altogether eliminating, the problems
of how this evidence is received.
(b) Narrative articulation. -Other concerns about victim im-
pact evidence relate to the activity of storytelling itself, rather than the
audience response. First, as the Booth majority noted, "in some cases
... the family members may be less articulate in describing their feel-
ings even though their sense of loss is equally severe. '55 This reminds
us that every story must be constructed, which requires an ability and
skill that exists unevenly in the population. The Booth majority goes
further, arguing that this is a reason to deem expressions of grief inad-
missible, since "the degree to which a family is ... able to express its
grief is irrelevant to the decision whether a defendant.., should live
or die."'5 6 In some sense the Court is right, just as it would be right to
53 Booth, 482 U.S. at 501.
54 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
55 Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
56 Id. As a threshold matter, there must be a story to construct and a storyteller to do the
constructing-and some murder victims may leave no survivors. Making victim impact evidence
part of the capital sentencing process may make the defendant's likelihood of receiving a death
sentence turn on the presence or absence of survivor-storytellers. Narratological questions to
one side, the fairness of such a situation implicates matters discussed above.
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say that a family's ability to pay for the best lawyers in the world is
irrelevant. But the fact that differing abilities may appear arbitrarily
in the population does not make it arbitrary to distinguish among the
different effects that those differing abilities help to produce. More-
over, as Justice White's dissent suggests, the Booth majority's argu-
ment proves too much. If courts were to exclude categories of
testimony simply because some witnesses are less articulate than
others, no category of oral testimony would be admissible.
(c) Narrative responsibility.-A more serious narrative
problem with victim impact evidence-though one that implicates no
constitutional rights of the defendant-concerns the consequences of
giving impact evidence on the survivors themselves. We have been
assuming thus far that survivors are pushing to have their stories
heard and that allowing victim impact evidence to be considered at
the sentencing phase promotes the interests of the victims and the sur-
vivors. But surely the dynamic of survivor testimony is far more com-
plicated. To tell the story of personal suffering requires the teller to
relive that suffering, to retrieve it from repression, and to re-expose
wounds that may have started to heal. This may be beneficially thera-
peutic, but it may not be. Moreover, for survivors to be asked to tell
about the victim's particular characteristics in this context invites a
predictable selectivity in detail. Typically, if not universally, people
have complex and conflicting feelings about family members. But
how frequently does victim impact evidence after a family member's
murder dwell on these complexities?
Participating in the sentencing process can also add to the survi-
vors' sense of responsibility and can potentially add to the sense of
guilt that survivors often feel.57 It can create new conflicts. For exam-
ple, survivors may not in fact want the defendant to receive the death
penalty-they may be opposed to it on moral grounds or may think it
recapitulates the violence they endured-but once included in the
sentencing process, they may feel pressure to join in seeking the death
penalty as an emblem of their outrage at the victim's murder. Where
the survivors do favor seeking the death penalty, including them in the
sentencing process may make them feel as if they have been given the
responsibility to persuade the jury to recommend the death penalty.
And if the jury that hears victim impact evidence does not recommend
the death penalty, survivors may feel that they have let the victim
down by not being adequately articulate in describing their suffering
or by not describing the victim with sufficiently appealing particular-
ity.58 This may add to the sense of guilt that survivors often have sim-
57 See Berger, supra note 11.
58 Testimony during the guilt phase of the trial can create some of this anxiety, but at that
stage survivor-witnesses typically testify to relatively objective facts-very different from the
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ply because they have survived or because they think that somehow
they could have saved the victim. 59
Put more generally, storytelling is often a risky and anxious activ-
ity, for there is always the possibility that a story will not be told effec-
tively. And the responsibility to tell victim impact stories, in
particular, imposes that risk and anxiety on an already-vulnerable
group of people. This may not deter victims' rights advocates from
pressing for greater inclusion for victims and survivors at the criminal
trial. But at the very least, it reminds us that storytelling has conse-
quences for the tellers as well as listeners. And the consequences may
not be what they at first seem.
II. VOYEURS
The victim is the subject of the trial, so the victim's place as at
least a character in the criminal trial's narrative is definitional. This is
not true of the general public, whose connection to the trial narrative
is less definite. Indeed, there is considerable ambivalence about the
general public's relationship to the trial; in some senses it is an indis-
pensable audience and participant, in other senses a deeply distrusted
one, always in danger of becoming a mob or "public opinion" that can
assault and undermine legal processes. But whatever the ambiva-
lence, the general public's increasing engagement with criminal trials
is having important consequences.
Four benign aspects of the public's role stand out in traditional
American ideas about the criminal trial. First, although the public is
not the direct subject of the trial, the public is a direct object or target
of the trial, for a central purpose of punishing particular individuals is
to deter criminal behavior by others. Put another way, the public is a
primary audience for the trial, although it has traditionally learned
about the trial through the heavy filter of media accounts.
Second, the public is a watchdog. Its presence at criminal trials is
thought to assure the sort of outside scrutiny that can help to prevent
injustice. Indeed, it is for that reason that the Constitution has been
interpreted to require that trials must almost always be open to mem-
bers of the public and the media. Note that this constitutional re-
quirement means only that the public and the media must be admitted
insofar as courtroom space permits; not all members of the public
have to be admitted, and, more importantly, there is no requirement
that the media must be allowed to televise court proceedings, which
accounts of subjective suffering or the heavily shaped victim portraiture in victim impact
evidence.
59 See, eg., Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation
in Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE
L REv. 7 (1987).
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would allow all members of the general public to see the trial for
themselves. Representatives of the public must generally be allowed to
attend criminal trials, not members of the public directly.
Third, what makes the criminal sanction unique is that it is said to
be an expression of public morality, to embody the moral condemna-
tion of the community. This means that a particular trial narrative is
usually part of a broader social narrative, and the public is generally
implicated in at least the latter. A related notion is that the trial is
supposed to channel the retributive desires of the public. We can call
this the public as voice. Once again, however, this public role (of
community morality and retribution) is mediated and restricted. For
one, at the legislative level, public morality is expressed through gen-
eral norms, not judgments about what particular individuals have
done; indeed, the Constitution prohibits legislatures from adopting
bills of attainder that punish particular individuals directly. In addi-
tion, at the trial itself, when a general norm is applied to particular
behavior, public morality is expressed through a jury, a representative
body that is supposedly screened for bias and restricted in what it may
hear and how it may assess what it hears. (In origin, of course, the
jury consisted of members of the community with direct knowledge of
the offense.) Put another way, the general public is always kept at
least one step removed from judgments in particular cases.
Fourth, and lastly, the public bestows or withholds public confi-
dence in the criminal process, and this can either weaken or
strengthen the public's faith in its government more generally.
In the past decade or two, the public has become more engaged
as an audience for and participant in criminal trials than before. This
may be part of a broader cultural interest in law-ranging from mass-
market entertainment like "L.A. Law" and John Grisham and Scott
Turow best-sellers to the real-life increase in litigiousness. But the fo-
cus on the criminal trial is a distinct subset of this general public en-
gagement. This engagement may result from a greater public fear
about crime. In any event, it is a development that has been propelled
and facilitated by the new technology of cameras in the courtroom
and Court TV, which have made the general public an immediate au-
dience for many trials. Criminal trials have also received increasingly
prominent coverage in the print media. Of course, there have been
celebrated and notorious trials throughout U.S. history. But today
there is almost always a trial that absorbs public attention, and the
degree of absorption seems greater than ever before. Criminal court
is always in session for the public audience. Over the past several
years, day after day, some criminal trial or other has been treated by
the media as a top national news story and received by the general
public in that way-recall only William Kennedy Smith, Jeffrey
Dahmer, Bernhard Goetz, the Menendez brothers, the Bobbitts,
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Heidi Fleiss, the police officers who arrested Rodney King, and most
recently and most flamboyantly, O.J. Simpson. Each trial is treated as
a major cultural event and thus becomes one. These developments
probably make the public better informed, as advocates of the tele-
vised coverage of criminal trials argue. But that characterization does
not quite capture the broader cultural consequences of the public's
greater involvement in trials.
These criminal trials have become a central moral arena for soci-
ety. Because the criminal law intersects so many areas of U.S. society,
the criminal trial is often the most prominent place where large moral
issues are scrutinized-ranging from racial issues to assisted suicide.
Criminal trials have always been a place for society to draw bounda-
ries, but the trial has taken a more important cultural place in drawing
these moral boundaries as other institutions that have traditionally en-
gaged in moral linedrawing, such as religion and the family, have de-
clined in strength. Moreover, the criminal trial has become an arena
in which social deviance is explored as well as defined-the twisted
deviance of Susan Smith, the apparently brazen evil of the Menendez
brothers.60 The main dynamic at the trial is to support the norms of
socially acceptable behavior by defining otherness, to mark off the
ways the guilty defendant is different from the law-abiding public au-
dience. But by providing the public with a close-up view of individu-
als on trial, by embedding the deviant act in circumstances that are
often not themselves deviant, by allowing the full consideration of all
the excuses offered up by defendants, the public also comes to experi-
ence the ways it is like, not simply different from, the criminal.
The criminal trial is also an important way for the public to con-
front its anger and fear over criminality, which have grown over the
past several decades such that crime is now the public's number one
concern. The point here is not simply that the result of a trial can
satisfy the retributive urges of the general public, although it can
surely do that. The form of the trial-its structure and formality-is
itself part of that coming to terms. The trial structures social disorder,
and thus makes it less disturbing and even enjoyable. It is the sus-
tained process of imposing the legal order on criminal violence that
reaffirms that life's disorder can be controlled. One of the great cul-
tural appeals of a television series like Perry Mason, a series that all
60 The highest visibility cases over the past several years have certain comm6n subject mat-
ters and themes. Most involve a riveting role reversal, as when a celebrity or member of some
respectable elite is accused of being base (Kennedy Smith, Simpson, the Menendez brothers,
Fleiss and her clientele, the Rodney King police). Most involve either matters of sex (Kennedy
Smith, Dahmer, the Bobbitts, Fleiss, Simpson) or race (Simpson, Rodney King). Only a few-
Susan Smith's killing of her children, for example-rivet precisely because of the emergence of
horrifying deviance out of utter ordinariness (although here too the notoriety developed out of a
major role reversal: the pleading mother revealed to be the hunted murderer).
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but defined "law" for a generation of Americans, was the patterned
closure of each program. The truth was always outed, the true crimi-
nal revealed, and the vindicated innocence of Perry Mason's client
stood for the vindicated order that the legal process predictably im-
posed. The appeal of the classic detective story is similar, given its
reiterated form: a puzzle of violence presented and ultimately solved,
and solved through orderly reasoning. Real-life trials obviously do
not have the neatness of the trials represented on Perry Mason, but
they have some of its patterned quality-and, above all, they usually
reach closure.
Not unrelated is that the criminal trial has become a source of
entertainment. Part of the appeal of the criminal trial is precisely that
real people have been hurt and that a real defendant may be exposed
and punished. But its reality does not interfere with-indeed, it ar-
guably enhances-its entertainment value. The trial can have the or-
ganized combat of spectator sports, the emotional tumult of a soap
opera, and the heightened suspense of a thriller. When people say
that the O.J. Simpson trial was a circus, part of what they surely mean
is that it became, like a circus, gaudy public entertainment. We see
this more generally now, as much of the media's coverage of "news"
has blurred into "entertainment," with entertainment values now
shaping what is covered, in what detail, and in what manner.
The trend toward a wide television audience for criminal trials
can be usefully considered alongside another recent development in
television that rivals it in importance and to which I think it is
linked-the rise of the Oprah-style television talk show. With each,
the subject is usually some socially extreme behavior, behavior that
tests or transgresses current boundaries of publicly acceptable con-
duct. The subjects are explored by considering the lives of actual peo-
ple. And the public audience to the spectacle and the exploration is
critical to each.
At the center of both Oprah and the trial is judgment. On Oprah
the studio audience is invited to ask questions, but its critical function
is to offer judgments of the behavior being displayed-and in articu-
lating its judgments the studio audience is a stand-in for the audience
at home, which is also invited to judge. What is critically important
when Oprah invites judgments is this: on Oprah, everyone's judgment
has the same weight; every judgment is valid. To feel validates judg-
ment. The implicit credo of Oprah's audience is "I feel, therefore I
may judge." The audience is endlessly valorized because Oprah treats
its judgments so respectfully. And the cultural impact of Oprah is that
it has increased the status of the ordinary person's judgment.
The widening coverage for criminal trials also invites public judg-
ments. Part of the appeal of the trial for the public audience is that it
invites these judgments: Did the defendant commit the crime?
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Should he be convicted? Is this or that witness lying? Are the lawyers
doing a good job? And so forth. As the public has been allowed into
the trial more and more as a direct audience, it has been encouraged
more and more to make these judgments.
But surely there is a problem. Judgment at trial is carefully struc-
tured and circumscribed. Most things about the trial refute the idea
that "I feel, therefore I may judge." Public judgment is rendered by
an institution that represents the public-the jury-but it is a repre-
sentative institution, whose members are screened and are expected
to conform to distinctive and circumscribed role behavior. Only ap-
propriately unbiased people are supposed to serve on juries and to
judge. The jury may not hear everything, only evidence admitted in
accordance with the restrictive law of evidence and procedure. Jurors
must be a constant rather than intermittent audience. They may not
be there one day and gone the next, but must hear and consider every-
thing that is admitted into evidence; and they must wait until the end
of the trial, until they have heard all the evidence, to discuss the case
with others and make their judgments. And, of course, the jury is
expected to follow the instructions of the judge, instructions that re-
flect established legal rules.
The general public audience is restricted in none of these re-
spects. It may be biased. It may be exposed to lots of evidence and
argument that are inadmissible in court-indeed, the media that
brings the public the trial itself also typically brings the public lots of
additional evidence and argument. At the same time, the public is
typically an intermittent audience and hears only part of the story.
And the public is either ignorant of the legal instructions given to the
jury or feels itself unrestrained by those instructions. Still-and this is
the crucial fact-the public feels itself entitled to pass judgment. "I
feel, therefore I may judge."
I do not wish to romanticize the jury, which in some respects is
infected with similar deficiencies, perhaps increasingly so. For exam-
ple, the very idea of a jury as objective and unbiased is being replaced
by the idea of a jury as a collection of representative biases. It was a
major step forward when we moved from a jury system that was out-
rageously elitist and exclusionary to one that was supposed to be "a
fair cross-section of the community." But the idea of "fair cross-sec-
tion," which was initially a tool for reducing biases on juries, is today
often used to legitimate biases as long as they are representative.
Consultants are trying to make more scientific a process of picking a
jury whose biases one side or the other likes-using the same tech-
niques of polling and focus groups used in politics. Moreover, there is
at least anecdotal evidence of an increase in jury nullificatio-an in-
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crease in jurors' thinking that they are "the people" who therefore
have the right to remake or disregard the law.61
But in spite of undoubted deficiencies in jury performance, the
jury audience remains sharply differentiated from the public audience
by pervasive restrictions on what it hears and how it behaves. And a
real tension exists between these two main audiences of the trial. The
jury decides, but the public separately decides on different evidence
and in accordance with different criteria. What is disturbing is the
public's increasing sense that it is either on a par with or superior to
the jury. Before and during a trial, the public is constantly polled to
see whether it thinks a notorious defendant is guilty or innocent, as if
the facts to be developed at trial were incidental to understanding.
Following a jury verdict, people on the street are interviewed about
what they think, as if their judgment was adequately informed. Or
they riot, as they did after the Rodney King verdict, and their rioting
is seen to embody a superior truth to that determined by the jury. It
matters not at all that the rioters may know next to nothing about the
actual trial or about rules like a requirement of proof beyond reason-
able doubt, and so forth. The trial becomes a mass political event, not
a legal process-at least, for the public audience it is one thing, and
for the jury audience it is another.
In a very real sense, there are now two trials: one for the jury and
one for the public. Part of the trial directed to the public is really
directed toward the jury, of course. Before the jury is picked in high-
profile cases-indeed, from the moment of arrest-trial lawyers in-
creasingly lay out their versions of the story to the public in large part
to affect the jury pool. One audience will become the other. Even
after the jury is selected, the lawyers know that public opinion has a
way of seeping into the courtroom-by influencing the lawyers, per-
haps by influencing the judge, and maybe even by influencing the sup-
posedly isolated jury. All the while, the lawyers may be polling or
conducting focus groups in the community, with the general public
treated as a proxy for the jury to test what arguments are likely to
work in court.
But the trial participants address the general public for other rea-
sons, both before and after the jury is chosen. They see the general
public as an important audience in its own right. There is a separate
trial for them. In part, this reflects the simple fact that "[t]he eager-
ness of a listener quickens the tongue of a narrator."62 But the "nar-
rators" also have a greater self-conscious awareness of the various
roles the public audience can play. In addition, the defense is con-
cerned about the defendant's public reputation, which is not necessar-
61 Color Blinded? Race Seems to Play an Increasing Role in Many Jury Verdicts, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 1995, at 1.
62 CHARLO=rl BRONTE, JANE EYRE 296 (Random House 1993) (1847).
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ily defined by the jury verdict, and all the lawyers may be concerned
about their own public reputations. They may do things in the court-
room, as well as outside, that cater to the broader public audience.
The media may themselves help to run a separate "public" trial for the
public's entertainment and their own financial gain.
We saw all of these things and much more in the O.J. Simpson
murder trial, about which a few separate words seem appropriate.
This most notorious and publicized criminal trial of our time was both
wildly aberrational and yet utterly revealing about general trends-
and in any event, has become an inescapable touchstone for reflec-
tions about the criminal trial today. The grotesque spectacles outside
the courtroom and in the media-and the public's insatiable appetite
for the case's mixture of race, sex, violence, and celebrity-seriously
damaged and debased the courtroom trial (which contained quite
enough disturbing elements by itself). At every point there was a trial
before the broader public at least as intense as the trial before the
jury, and this broader public trial, magnified and distended by the me-
dia, profoundly affected what went on in the courtroom. Even inter-
mittently attentive and poorly informed segments of the public felt
justified in judging Simpson's guilt or innocence-and quite beyond
whether Simpson was deemed guilty or innocent, vast segments of the
public approached the trial as an occasion for cultural and sociological
interpretation in which the defendant and victims became relatively
minor details.
The jury's not-guilty verdict determined Simpson's courtroom
fate. But his broader fate, as it seems to be playing out, is being deter-
mined by the court of public opinion, and much of the public has
judged him a murderer (whether or not proven so beyond a reason-
able doubt) and treats him like a pariah. The trial came to affect
much more than Simpson's personal fate, however. It also affected
public attitudes about lawyers, the criminal justice system itself, and
cameras in the courtroom, and most important of all, relations be-
tween blacks and whites throughout the country.
Everything about the case took on heightened significance be-
cause of race. The defendant was a black sports hero and entertainer;
the victims (a former wife he had repeatedly abused and a male friend
of hers) were both white; the leading police department investigators
on the case were white, and at least one of them was an open racist;
the police department itself had a notorious history of racism; and the
jury that acquitted was mostly black. The trial before the jury was
punctuated by racial iconography, arguments, and codes; and the trial
involving the public outside the courthouse, where constraints of the
courtroom were inapplicable, became even more intensely race-
focused. Judge Lance Ito, who presided at the trial, excluded certain
odious evidence of police racism from jury consideration as irrelevant
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to its deliberations but allowed that evidence to be aired in open
court, apparently for the very purpose of having it be heard by the
general public. Throughout the trial, opinion polls and media inter-
views informed the public that it was sharply divided along racial lines
about the defendant's guilt. And from the start the public debated the
racial significance of the case in the media and in day-to-day life.
The racial character of the case was intensified by the backdrop
of powerful historical narratives about blacks and whites that were
repeatedly used (sometimes unconsciously) to shape how the basic
facts of the courtroom stories were perceived or to invest those facts
with some wider symbolic meaning or resonance. For some blacks, for
example, Simpson became a symbolic victim of the racism facing
blacks throughout U.S. history, or at least a black hero whose fall
would damage an entire race; for some, the trial became a test of
whether a wealthy black celebrity could beat the system as wealthy
whites often had before him, or whether black jurors would strike out
against evidence of continuing white racism. To the extent blacks
came to see Simpson as a racially symbolic figure, instead of just one
man, the actual facts of the case almost did not matter. Similarly,
many whites invested the case with emblematic significance. For some
whites, the evidence that a mainstream black celebrity who seemed so
polished and likable might really be a brutal murderer reawakened
atavistic fear and distrust of all blacks, or Simpson became the proto-
typical hustler using an irrelevant cry of racism to try to get away with
murder. The jury was seen as not just a few individuals, most of whom
happened to be black, but instead became a landmark test of blacks'
capacity to wield public power and govern responsibly. The
foregrounding of these wider possible meanings is what made the trial
so traumatic an event in our country's tortured history of race
relations.
Significantly, the racial divisions fostered by the trial were not
simply over Simpson's guilt or innocence but also over how the public
reacted to the not-guilty verdict. After the verdict, the public audi-
ence judged both the defendant and the trial (including the witnesses
and the jury), and then different segments of the public judged each
other's reactions. These public reactions to the verdict revealed-and
probably deepened-a huge racial divide in the country. Televised
scenes of blacks jumping for joy at the verdict shocked many whites
more than the verdict itself, for that audience reaction revealed feel-
ings and beliefs that a public opinion poll or a jury's secret vote could
not. Many blacks, in turn, were angered at the aggressive disbelief
many whites expressed about the verdict and its defenders, seeing that
disbelief as a judgment that the mostly black jury and its defenders
lacked the ability or willingness to voice the plain truth. The public
audience for the trial became not simply listeners to racial narratives
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but authors of racial narratives as well. And in both of these roles, the
public audience shaped the trial's enduring meaning far more than the
jury could. In short, the second trial-the one before the public-
largely displaced the first.
Nothing, of course, was typical about the Simpson case, and very
little was admirable, including the disturbing jury verdict (reached af-
ter only three hours of deliberation) and the divisions fostered by the
public verdicts. But the public's central role in the Simpson case, and
its eventual overshadowing of the jury, is only an extreme and dis-
torted instance of an increasingly common situation.
Indeed, as the general public increasingly pushes its way into the
criminal trial, we are witnessing a phenomenon that seems connected
to a broader cultural trend in American political life. Even as our
political institutions have become more representative of America's
diversity-just as the jury has become so-faith in representative in-
stitutions has declined. We are witnessing a rise in a commitment to
direct democracy and a weakening belief in representative democracy.
This movement, like that concerning criminal trials, is fueled by tech-
nology: C-Span, instantaneous public opinion polling, fax machines,
talk radio, Internet, and so forth. But technology is simply facilitating
what is a moral revolution. The people believe they have a right to
decide, not just at the end of the day when elections are held and their
representatives' achievements are assessed, but day by day as issues
receive legislative consideration. Political representatives themselves
have lost either the faith or the courage to act as representatives.
Daily they look to see what the public thinks, as if the public at every
moment really were informed and knew how to assess its or the coun-
try's interests. This, of course, is a recipe for disaster: Representa-
tives deliver policies that they know will not work but that satisfy
some transient public mood; when the policies do not work, the public
becomes further disenchanted with its representatives and demands
even more direct input; that, in turn, usually produces even worse pol-
icies, and so forth. In such a climate, it becomes unthinkable-or at
least terribly risky-to speak of expertise or the importance of repre-
sentative democracy, or to tell "the people" that they and their fre-
quently confused and contradictory desires are part of the problem.
In the case of politics, it can at least be said that our representa-
tives have often failed in their roles, that they have not led strongly
enough or taken even minimal chances in trying to handle the coun-
try's hard problems, or that they have too often been corrupt. But in
the case of law and the courts, these points cannot be said. The courts
have generally done a good job, and they have been meticulous and
fair in most of the high-profle cases that galvanized the public in re-
cent years. The media's and public's incursion into the courts is not
the consequence of the courts' failures, even though it may rest in part
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on the public's increasing concerns about crime. To a large extent, it
rests on a combination of voyeurs' prurient interests and the media's
financial motivation. And to that extent, it reflects not a wholesome
measure of informed critical scrutiny but destructive self-indulgence.
I am suggesting, in short, that the widening audience for the crim-
inal trial can corrupt the storytellers at the trial. But that cannot be
the judgment that ends my account. The reality of this wider audi-
ence's engagement cannot be wished away and is likely to endure. In
part it will endure because it rests on another reality: crime and fear
of crime are more central in people's lives these days. Neither real-
ity-the public's great concern about crime or the public's closer ob-
servation of the criminal trial-can be ignored.
If the broader public audience sees the courts to be mishandling
their tasks, the credibility of the courts and of law itself will be greatly
hurt. The answer, of course, cannot be to allow public opinion to in-
fluence trial verdicts; that would destroy law in the name of saving it.
But the courts' understandable concern about their authority, credibil-
ity, and effectiveness may justifiably lead them to take account of cer-
tain public attitudes when that does not destroy the integrity of law.
Here, then, I come back to the issue of victim impact evidence.
Taking some account of public opinion, I believe, is one reason why
victim impact evidence probably has a place at the capital murder
trial. (I discuss other reasons above and would not reach my overall
conclusion without those reasons.) In pressing for inclusion at trial,
the victim and the victim's survivors are proxies for the general public,
because people at large tend to see themselves as potential crime vic-
tims. To treat victim impact evidence as off-limits, especially when
such particularized evidence about the defendant is within-limits,
would be to say that what the public connects with most at the trial is
inadmissible. If we wish to keep public confidence in the courts and
public faith in law, and if we wish to allow the courts to continue to
play their role of channeling public revenge, we cannot exclude too
much of the reality of life-just as we cannot let too much in.
Justice Stevens ends his dissent in Payne v. Tennessee by ruefully
suggesting that "the 'hydraulic pressure' of public opinion" may ex-
plain the result that the majority reaches:
Given the current popularity of capital punishment in a crime-rid-
den society, the political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing
the severity of sentences is the best cure for the cancer of crime, and the
political strength of the "victims' rights" movement, I recognize that to-
day's decision will be greeted with enthusiasm by a large number of con-
cerned and thoughtful citizens. The great tragedy of the decision,
however, is the danger that the "hydraulic pressure" of public opinion
that Justice Holmes once described-and that properly influences the
deliberations of democratic legislatures-has played a role not only in
892
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the Court's decision to hear this case,... but even in its resolution of the
constitutional issue involved. Today is a sad day for a great institution.63
Justice Stevens's narrative is a counter-narrative of explanation
that seeks to undercut the majority's very different justification for its
conclusion. He has accurately described the public climate and identi-
fied a real danger. But I think he greatly simplifies the matter of pub-
lic opinion and judicial action. The place of public opinion cannot be
dismissed so quickly, with "a sad day" proclaimed because a great
public institution may have tried to retain the confidence of its public
audience. The hard reality, perhaps tragic even if not sad, is that judi-
cial narratives must be written with some attention to wider public
narratives, and this may both threaten and sustain the greatness of our
judicial institutions.
893
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APPENDIX
Victim Impact Statement Read to the Penalty-Phase Jury in Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)
"Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's son, daughter, son-in-law, and grand-
daughter were interviewed for purposes of the Victim Impact State-
ment. There are also four other grandchildren in the family. The
victims' son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three
years and enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day to-
gether. He states that his father had worked hard all his life and had
been retired for eight years. He describes his mother as a woman who
was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady. She taught
herself to play bridge when she was in her seventies. The victims' son
relates that his parents were amazing people who attended the senior
citizens' center and made many devout friends. He indicates that he
was very close to his parents, and that he talked to them every day.
The victims' daughter also spent lots of time with them.
"The victims' son saw his parents alive for the last time on May
18th. They were having their lawn manicured and were excited by the
onset of spring. He called them on the phone that evening and re-
ceived no answer. He had made arrangements to pick Mr. Bronstein
up on May 20th. They were both to be ushers in a granddaughter's
wedding and were going to pick up their tuxedos. When he arrived at
the house on May 20th he noticed that his parents' car wasn't there.
A neighbor told him that he hadn't seen the car in several days and he
knew something was wrong. He went to his parents' house and found
them murdered. He called his sister crying and told her to come right
over because something terrible had happened and their parents were
both dead.
"The victims' daughter recalls that when she arrived at her par-
ents' house, there were police officers and television crews every-
where. She felt numb and cold. She was not allowed to go into the
house and so she went to a neighbor's home. There were people and
reporters everywhere and all she could feel was cold. She called her
older daughter and told her what had happened. She told her daugh-
ter to get her husband and then tell her younger daughter what had
happened. The younger daughter was to be married two days later.
"The victims' granddaughter reports that just before she received
the call from her mother she had telephoned her grandparents and
received no answer. After her mother told her what happened she
turned on the television and heard the news reports about it. The
victims' son reports that his children first learned about their grand-
parents' death from the television reports.
"Since the Jewish religion dictates that birth and marriage are
more important than death, the granddaughter's wedding had to pro-
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ceed on May 22nd. She had been looking forward to it eagerly, but it
was a sad occasion with people crying. The reception, which normally
would have lasted for hours, was very brief. The next day, instead of
going on her honeymoon, she attended her grandparents' funerals.
The victims' son, who was an usher at the wedding, cannot remember
being there or coming and going from his parents' funeral the next
day. The victims' granddaughter, on the other hand, vividly remem-
bers every detail of the days following her grandparents' death. Per-
haps she described the impact of the tragedy most eloquently when
she stated that it was a completely devastating and life altering
experience.
"The victims' son states that he can only think of his parents in
the context of how he found them that day, and he can feel their fear
and horror. It was 4:00 p.m. when he discovered their bodies and this
stands out in his mind. He is always aware of when 4:00 p.m. comes
each day, even when he is not near a clock. He also wakes up at 4:00
a.m. each morning. The victims' son states that he suffers from lack of
sleep. He is unable to drive on the streets that pass near his parents'
home. He also avoids driving past his father's favorite restaurant, the
supermarket where his parents shopped, etc. He is constantly re-
minded of his parents. He sees his father coming out of synagogues,
sees his parents' car, and feels very sad whenever he sees old people.
The victims' son feels that his parents were not killed, but were butch-
ered like animals. He doesn't think anyone should be able to do
something like that and get away with it. He is very angry and wishes
he could sleep and not feel so depressed all the time. He is fearful for
the first time in his life, putting all the lights on and checking the locks
frequently. His children are scared for him and concerned for his
health. They phone him several times a day. At the same time he
takes a fearful approach to the whereabouts of his children. He also
calls his sister every day. He states that he is frightened by his own
reaction of what he would do if someone hurt him or a family mem-
ber. He doesn't know if he'll ever be the same again.
"The victims' daughter and her husband didn't eat dinner for
three days following the discovery of Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein's bodies.
They cried together every day for four months and she still cries every
day. She states that she doesn't sleep through a single night and
thinks a part of her died too when her parents were killed. She re-
ports that she doesn't find much joy in anything and her powers of
concentration aren't good. She feels as if her brain is on overload.
The victims' daughter relates that she had to clean out her parents'
house and it took several weeks. She saw the bloody carpet, knowing
that her parents had been there, and she felt like getting down on the
rug and holding her mother. She wonders how this could have hap-
pened to her family because they're just ordinary people. The victims'
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daughter reports that she had become noticeably withdrawn and de-
pressed at work and is now making an effort to be more outgoing.
She notes that she is so emotionally tired because she doesn't sleep at
night, that she has a tendency to fall asleep when she attends social
events such as dinner parties or the symphony. The victims' daughter
states that wherever she goes she sees and hears her parents. This
happens every day. She cannot look at kitchen knives without being
reminded of the murders and she is never away from it. She states
that she can't watch movies with bodies or stabbings in it. She can't
tolerate any reminder of violence. The victims' daughter relates that
she used to be very trusting, but is not any longer. When the doorbell
rings she tells her husband not to answer it. She is very suspicious of
people and was never that way before.
"The victims' daughter attended the defendant's trial and that of
the co-defendant because she felt someone should be there to repre-
sent her parents. She had never been told the exact details of her
parents' death and had to listen to the medical examiner's report. Af-
ter a certain point, her mind blocked out and she stopped hearing.
She states that her parents were stabbed repeatedly with viciousness
and she could never forgive anyone for killing them that way. She
can't believe that anybody could do that to someone. The victims'
daughter states that animals wouldn't do this. They didn't have to kill
because there was no one to stop them from looting. Her father
would have given them anything. The murders show the viciousness
of the killers' anger. She doesn't feel that the people who did this
could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want them to be able to do
this again or put another family through this. She feels that the lives
of her family members will never be the same again.
"The victims' granddaughter states that unless you experience
something like this you can't understand how it feels. You are in a
state of shock for several months and then a terrible depression sets
in. You are so angry and feel such rage. She states that she only
dwells on the image of their death when thinking of her grandparents.
For a time she would become hysterical whenever she saw dead ani-
mals on the road. She is not able to drive near her grandparents'
house and will never be able to go into their neighborhood again. The
victims' granddaughter also has a tendency to turn on all the lights in
her house. She goes into a panic if her husband is late coming home
from work. She used to be an avid reader of murder mysteries, but
will never be able to read them again. She has to turn off the radio or
T.V. when reports of violence come on because they hit too close to
home. When she gets a newspaper she reads the comics and throws
the rest away. She states that it is the small everyday things that haunt
her constantly and always will. She saw a counselor for several
months but stopped because she felt that no one could help her.
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"The victims' granddaughter states that the whole thing has been
very hard on her sister too. Her wedding anniversary will always be
bittersweet and tainted by the memory of what happened to her
grandparents. This year on her anniversary she and her husband qui-
etly went out of town. The victims' granddaughter finds that she is
unable to look at her sister's wedding pictures. She also has a picture
of her grandparents, but had to put it away because it was too painful
to look at it.
"The victims' family members note that the trials of the suspects
charged with these offenses have been delayed for over a year and the
postponements have been very hard on the family emotionally. The
victims' son notes that he keeps seeing news reports about his parents'
murder which show their house and the police removing their bodies.
This is a constant reminder to him. The family wants the whole thing
to be over with and they would like to see swift and just punishment.
"As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were lov-
ing parents and grandparents whose family was most important to
them. Their funeral was the largest in the history of the Levinson Fu-
neral Home and the family received over one thousand sympathy
cards, some from total strangers. They attempted to answer each card
personally. The family states that Mr. and Mrs. Bronstein were ex-
tremely good people who wouldn't hurt a fly. Because of their loss, a
terrible void has been put into their lives and every day is still a strain
just to get through. It became increasingly apparent to the writer as
she talked to the family members that the murder of Mr. and Mrs.
Bronstein is still such a shocking, painful, and devastating memory to
them that it permeates every aspect of their daily lives. It is doubtful
that they will ever be able to fully recover from this tragedy and not
be haunted by the memory of the brutal manner in which their loved
ones were murdered and taken from them."
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